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Abstract: 
The netchain laboratory is a new place to experiment with netchains. It focuses on the 
institutional and socio-economic environment of netchains, and on governance 
mechanisms in particular. The integration of social and societal factors in the institutional 
economics theory is studied using real humans playing a role in a simulated netchain. 
This paper describes the approach on the laboratory and some current experiences. It ends 
with a discussion on the impact of laboratory for practice in real-world netchains. 
Introduction 
Fiercer global competition, rapid technology change and choosier customers are forcing 
firms to seek more efficient production and distribution structures. In recent years, 
industries have shown increasing collaboration on issues of product development, quality 
guarantee systems and improved logistics. (Hendrikse, 2003) The concept of netchains 
(Lazzarini et al, 2001) describes these collaborations. It brings together the production-
flow and transaction cost oriented approach of Supply Chain Analysis (chains) with the 
social structure and learning approach of Network Analysis (networks).  
Hendrikse (2003) presents a research agenda for the unanswered issue of governance in 
chains and networks. The netchain laboratory aims to contribute to the answers of the 
questions: Which coordination mechanisms are used in chains and networks, and why? 
And: How are relational contracts enforced? 
 
This paper presents the way in which the netchain laboratory tries to answer these 
questions and results already achieved. It starts with a description of the problem field. 
This is followed by the methodology used: simulation gaming. Then it describes the 
theories used in the conceptual framework. The conceptual game is the operational model 
behind any of the simulation games. This is followed by some games we are using with 
their experiences and future planning. The paper ends with a discussion on the impact of 
laboratory for practice in real-world netchains. 
Problem field 
Doing business is an activity between humans. Individuals represent their company in 
negotiations, daily operations, conflicts, et cetera. The interaction between these 
individuals in a chain or network determines the overall conduct. It is the sum of all 
individuals what determines the overall outcome. Ridley (1996) describes in his book 
“The origins of virtue” how individual interests can be lowered to make the group 
stronger, which is in the interest of the individual in return. Game theory offers a 
mathemathical insight in the difficulties and chances of cooperation. (Axelrod, 1984) 
Limitations to the action space of the individuals come from the structure of the business 
environment. Technical limitations, legal systems, societal values and more are beyond 
the influence of the individual and thus a given structure that limits the number of 
possible ways of conduct. The conduct leads to a performance both on the individual 
level, the level of the organization the individual represents and the overall netchain 
performance. 
The focus of netchains implies that we are no longer interested in the best performance of 
the individual company but concentrate in the best overall performance of the netchain. 
Questions arises how to keep all the businesses “in the boat” and prevent free-rider 
behavior. Divisions of profits and costs, risk and responsibility is where governance 
comes into play. The netchain laboratory focuses on coordination mechanisms, relational 
contracting, communication and information asymmetry, and aims to contribute to theory 
on governance. With this theory practice in netchains could be understood and redesign 
issues could be analyzed better. 
Methodology 
Frequently used research methods for netchains include questionnaire surveys, 
simulations and case observations. These methods put emphasis on the quantification of 
netchain results and empirical testing of model outcomes. (Omta et al, 2001). 
Questionnaire surveys and case observations both are not suited for experiments with 
configuration or other determining factors in a netchain, as these methods are used to 
describe an existing or changing situation. Simulation aims to model the real world and 
predict outcomes of different configurations, technical innovations and incentive 
schemes, but is hardly able to simulate the complexity of relations between real human 
beings. 
 
Simulation gaming opens perspectives for this field of research. It combines modeling the 
real world in a simulation with the social complexity caught in the gaming aspect. The 
netchain laboratory uses simulation gaming as its main methodology. 
Meijer and Hofstede (2003, 1) made an overview of existing simulation games for 
netchains in the agro and health care sector in the Netherlands. The simulation games of 
the netchain laboratory proved to be a new extension to the existing simulation gaming 
method. Most simulation games taking social dynamics in account do not use a ‘bounded 
world model’ like these games do. The netchain laboratory games rely on explicitly 
defined simulations of the real world.  
 
Conceptual Framework 
Facilitating research on governance mechanisms and relational contracting, the netchain 
laboratory uses a conceptual framework of theories. This section describes the theories or 
concepts used. They stem from economy, management studies and sociology. 
Dependencies 
Lazzarini et al (2001) describe a netchain as a set of organisations linked by three types 
of interdependencies (Thompson, 1967). They call the organisations ‘agents’. 
• Pooled interdependency: in this case, interdependency involves discrete or 
autonomous contributions by loosely coupled agents. It supports a situation of 
knowledge diversity, where specialized agents exchange knowledge directly 
or indirectly through products or services that embody such knowledge. The 
connection between agents tends to be mediated by some underlying 
technology or organisational mode. No agent is directly dependent on another 
agent, but it cannot function without the input of the group. A good example is 
the development of the open source computer operating system Linux. No 
single programmer is on the critical path of the development of this operating 
system, and no one would be able to have the whole package himself without 
the input of the group. Linux is a good example of industry and volunteers 
working together too. (http://www.osdl.org) 
• Sequential interdependency: this involves direct relationships between agents 
ordered in a serial fashion: one agent’s input is another agent’s output. 
Sources of value within such a relationship come from inventory 
management, logistics and the like to optimise production processes and 
operations, and from governance mechanisms to reduce transaction costs and 
appropriate property rights up- or downstream in the netchain. 
• Reciprocal interdependency: this means that one agent’s input is another 
agent’s output and vice versa. Consequently, agents are mutually dependent 
on the choices and actions made by each other. This suggests a situation of 
strong social ties and dense networks. 
Governance 
Governance is about the organisation of transactions, and a governance structure consists 
of a collection of rules, institutions and constraints structuring the transaction between 
various stakeholders. Governance matters because contracts are in general incomplete. 
Contractual incompleteness is due to the impossibility to specify everything ex ante. 
(Hendrikse, 2003) 
Powell (1990) distinguishes three types of institutions: the market, hierarchy and network 
mechanism. The three types are extremes on a continuum; in practice, there exist mixed 
forms. Diederen and Jonkers (2001) place them at the corners of a triangle (See figure 1) 
If people or organisations (agents) meet as independent actors to exchange something in 
return for something else, we call this a market. An important characteristic is the 
independence of the agents: they are free to exchange and have no obligations against 
each other. This mechanism functions well if the market is transparent. In most seller-
buyer exchanges there is information asymmetry. Costs and risks associated with this 
asymmetry largely determine the costs of the market mechanism. 
Hierarchy uses an exchange relationship where one actor can determine ex post what the 
other will do, in exchange for some price that has been concluded ex ante. Once a 
hierarchical relationship has been concluded, people or organisations do not meet each 
other as autonomous actors: there is a principal and an agent. Costs of the mechanism, 
known as agency costs, entail overcoming the information asymmetry and tendency for 
opportunistic behaviour by monitoring and aligning objectives. 
The network mechanism governs exchanges by informal norms. Norms guide the 
behaviour of groups of actors that entertain long-term relationships. In this relationship 
the return of an exchange is not yet certain in: whether the occasion will occur where the 
return should be delivered, what the return actually will be, and often who exactly will 
deliver the return. Hendrikse (2003) calls contracts between organisations that (partially) 
rely on this mechanism: relational contracts. The fulfilling of such a contract is on his 
research agenda. Costs associated with networks are caused by the efforts to maintain a 
relation. 
 
 
Figure 1: Market institutional mechanisms (Diederen and Jonkers, 2001) 
Diederen and Jonkers (2001) distinguish four flows through a netchain: goods, money, 
information and signals of re-assurance. An exchange between two agents can contain 
one or more of these flows. The goods and money flows will be present under any 
governance structure. The information aspect is related to transparency (see below). The 
signals of re-assurance are related to the network aspect.  
Transaction cost economics 
A governance mechanism will be chosen, fitting best a netchain or other type of 
production network, thus incurring the lowest transaction costs. That is the central 
thought of Transaction Cost Economics (Williamson, 1985). Williamson (1998) applies 
his thoughts merely to the axis Market – Hierarchy, and situations where a hierarchy is 
not possible and government has to take over. Menard (2003) extends the transaction cost 
theory to networks. Hofstede (2004) summarizes this extension. Menard distinguishes 
four hybrid forms of governance, settled between market and hierarchy, called trust, 
relational network, leadership and formal government. These are social concepts applied 
in a concept of transaction costs. Linking these terms to dependencies leads to the 
conclusion that the transaction costs associated with these four forms of governance are 
the minimum costs possible to ensure reciprocal and especially sequential 
interdependencies. 
Social and societal factors 
Culture and legal systems. 
Williamson (1998) recognizes the importance of culture for the performance of 
businesses. He introduces a four-layer scheme in which the least changing layer is culture 
and religion, then comes the institutional environment with legal structure of a country 
and other formal ‘rules-of-the-game’, then the governance structure (the play-of-the-
game) and on the fourth level the continuous conduct of the business with resource 
allocation and employment. Transaction cost economics plays on the third level, but not 
independent of the first level. 
In the netchain laboratory we play games with different cultural groups. Comparing 
sessions of the same game leads to insight in differences between cultures.  
Hofstede (2001) developed culture dimensions to express differences between cultures. 
Hofstede (2004) applies this to netchains. 
 
Trust and transparency 
Food and business scandals led to a growing demand of transparency from consumers 
and media. Hofstede et al (2003, 1) define transparency as the extent to which all the 
netchain’s stakeholders have access to the information that they request. This 
information availability can be assured in various ways, dependent of the type of the 
relations, the interdependencies, culture of the agents and the governance of the netchain. 
A key variable is trust: a psychological state comprising the intention to accept 
vulnerability based upon positive expectations of the intentions or behavior of another. 
(Rousseau et al, 1998). Hofstede (2003, 2) notices a possible contradiction between trust 
and transparency. Good friends do not need to tell each other information as long as 
nothing is wrong. When one agent checks another, this may be perceived as distrust. On 
the other hand, building a shared information system might be a stepping-stone too to 
form new trust. 
Relations 
In many sectors traders will not be complete strangers to each other for each transaction. 
Some people know each other personally, some might be friends and some may have 
disputes in the past. Uzzi (1997) describes the situation in the New York fashion industry 
where personal relations are highly important for the functioning of the netchain. Uzzi 
speaks of embedded ties versus arm’s length ties for the closeness of companies. 
Strategic information about market movements is spread through the embedded ties, thus 
favoring the closer relations. 
Ng et al (2003) give the following research argument as central thought for the relevance 
of research to these information-sharing relations. They argue “Supply chain networks 
(netchains, SM) are comprised of reciprocal interactions found at different levels of 
aggregation. The dynamic behavior of these interactions is influenced by social network 
relations of strong and weak information ties in which such network relations impact the 
convergence and exploration of network activities.” 
 
Conceptual Game 
The netchain laboratory uses one conceptual game for all simulation games developed. 
Each game is an instantiation of (a part of) this conceptual game, suited for the problem 
of the specific game.  
The structure of the conceptual game is the entity-relationship diagram in figure 2. This is 
a technique most commonly used for database design. A quick explanation and 
references can be found online at 
http://www.smartdraw.com/resources/centers/software/erd.htm. 
 
The conceptual game describes all operational variables in the set of simulation games 
the netchain laboratory uses. The variables are all relevant entities and aspects that can be 
counted or distinguished separately found in the conceptual framework. Some concepts 
and theories, like culture and relations, cannot be operationalised in such variables and 
will be used for the interpretation of game sessions afterwards only. 
Figure 2 describes the entities with selected attributes. 
 
 
Figure 2: Data model of conceptual game 
 
Table 1: variables of conceptual game 
Variable 
Description Relation Theory S/C/P 
Contract Agreement between two 
Tradeagents about one or more 
Transactions in a Market. 
Defines transactions 
Belongs to seller Tradeagent 
Belongs to buyer Tradeagent 
Takes place in Market 
Governance Conduct 
Financial_Situation Bank account Is property of Tradegroup Economics Performance 
Government Law making agent Makes one or more Law Legal systems Structure 
GovMakesLaw Defines which Government made 
a Law 
Is done by Government. 
Makes Law. 
Legal systems Conduct 
Interdep Interdependency between two 
tradegroups 
Tradegroup is first party. 
Tradegroup is second party. 
Is of an Interdep_Type 
Interdependencies Structure 
Interdep_Type Type of Interdependency between 
two Tradegroups. (Pooled, 
Sequential or Reciprocal) 
Defines type of Interdep Interdependencies Structure 
Law Rule in the game Is made by Government 
Determines TCost_Type 
Legal systems Structure 
Market Place where Contracts are made Is provided access to via 
Market_Access_Right. 
Is place where Contract is 
made. 
Governance Structure 
Market_Access_-
Right 
The right of a Tradegroup to 
access a Market 
Give Tradegroup access. 
Gives access to Market 
Governance Structure 
Product_Type Type of Product in game Is stocked in Stock. 
Is processed in Recipe 
 Structure 
Production_Facility Resource to process Stock 
material in other Stock material 
Belongs to Tradegroup. 
Can perform 
Transformation_Function 
 Structure 
Recipe Rule what goes in a 
Transformation_Function and 
what comes out of it. 
Defines input and output of 
Transformation_Function. 
Uses Product_Type 
 Structure 
Relational_Tie Social tie between two 
Tradeagents. 
Is of type Tie_Type 
Couples two Tradeagents. 
Social Performance 
Role Defines tasks and responsibilities 
of Tradeagent in Tradegroup 
Belongs to Tradegroup. 
Is fulfilled by Tradeagent. 
Governance Structure 
Stock Storage of a particular 
Product_Type for a Tradegroup 
Belongs to Tradegroup. 
Stocks Product_Type 
 Performance 
TCDependsOnLaw Defines the influence of a Law on 
a TCost_Type 
Law of influence. 
TCost_Type influenced 
Legal system Structure 
Tie_Type Type of relational_tie between two 
Tradeagents. (Family, friends, like 
to do business with each other, 
etc) 
Defines type of Relational_Tie Social Structure 
Tradeagent One person making transactions 
in a role. Among the attributes are 
demographic properties. 
Fulfills Role. 
Is seller in Contract 
Is buyer in Contract. 
Has Relational_Tie(s) 
 Structure 
Tradegroup Organisation of tradeagents 
fulfilling roles with one combined 
performance and shared 
resources. 
Tradegroup is part of larger 
Tradegroup. 
Consists of Roles. 
Has Interdep. 
Has Production_Facility 
Governance 
Social, 
Interdependencies 
Structure 
Transaction An agreement on exchange of 
something between two 
Tradeagents in a particular Market 
Happens in Market. 
Belongs to Contract. 
Costs TCosts 
Is specified by TAttributes 
Transaction costs, 
Governance 
Conduct 
TAttribute Specification of a transaction Is of TAttribute_Type. 
Belongs to Transaction 
 Conduct 
TAttribute_Type Types of TAttributes in the game. 
(Diederen and Jonkers, 2001: 
Goods, Money, Information and 
Signals of re-assurance.) 
Defines type of TAttribute  Structure 
TCost Costs involved with a Transaction. Is of TCost_Type 
Belongs to Transaction. 
Transaction costs Conduct 
TCost_Type Types of transaction costs with 
their price per unit. (Diederen and 
Jonkers, 2001: Searching, 
Bargaining, Contracting, 
Monitoring and Enforcing 
Contracts) 
Defines type of TCost. 
Is dependent on Law 
Transaction costs Structure 
Transformation_Funct
ion 
The transformation process a 
Production_Facility can perform 
on Stock using Recipe 
Is done in Production_Facility. 
Uses Recipe 
 Structure 
 
The variables are grouped in three groups: structure variables, conduct variables and 
performance variables, following the approach of Viaene and Gellynck (1995). 
Following the theory of transaction cost economics, the structure of a netchain should 
match the conduct of business in the netchain. The performance is the result of it. 
Variations in the conduct and performance of a netchain point to other influences that are 
important next to the structure present in the netchain. 
 
Table 1 lists the variables, their relations and place in structure, conduct, performance 
model. 
Netchain laboratory experiences 
Trust and tracing game 
This simulation game focuses on the relation between information asymmetry, trust and 
transparency. Participants (Tradeagents) play the role of single representant of producers, 
middlemen, retailers and consumers (Tradegroups) in a netchain of products with a 
hidden quality attribute. Sealed envelopes with coded cards quality card (high or low) 
inside and three different colours on the outside make six product-types available in the 
game. Meijer and Hofstede (2003, 2) describe the game in more detail. The incentive 
structure (a.o. Transaction_Costs) behind the game is the so-called Trader’s Predicament: 
a Prisoner’s Dilemma-like matrix of consequences of the actions of a seller and buyer. 
The game uses sequential interdependencies between the tradegroups, because of the 
dependence on the honesty of the seller to guarantee quality throughout the netchain. 
Relational ties taken into account are existing friendships, colleagues and reputation 
(willingness to do new transactions with another). 
Until now the Trust and Tracing game is played in 15 sessions, mostly with Dutch 
groups, but with international groups and American groups as well. Conclusions draw 
from these sessions are: 
1. Culture is a major denominator for the attitude towards transparency. 
American groups tend to trace upfront, Dutch trace afterwards or not at all. 
2. The use of closed envelopes as model of products is recognised as realistic. 
3. Relations within a group have major consequences for the governance 
structures emerging during the session. Friends often favour each other, an 
example of embedded ties. Reputable people get traced less. 
Costa Rica Game 
Bargaining power within a Mango or Plantain netchain in Costa Rica is the topic of this 
game. Participants (Tradeagents) play the parties (Tradegroups) involved in the real-
world netchain (overall Tradegroup), including producer associations, multinationals, 
independent exporters, local retail and Western retail organisations. The game puts the 
participants in a situation where they have to choose for one of three markets to make 
contracts. Each of the markets represents a corner of the triangle in figure 1 with the 
associated number of transactions and transaction costs. The producer and end consumer 
market are accessible for selected Tradegroups only. (Market_Access_Right).  
 
The game is in the test and validation phase in The Netherlands at the time of writing 
(March 2004). Field sessions in Costa Rica are scheduled for September and October 
2004. Current sessions show differences in the behavior of multinationals compared to 
independent producers in choice of the market they are in. Strategic alliances between 
close friends occurred in multiple sessions. 
Other cases 
A cooperation of the netchain laboratory and the agro technology and food department of 
Wageningen University should deliver a netchain capable version of the tracking and 
tracing game. This game focuses on the quality of information management throughout a 
chain, and is currently restricted to a linear chain. Depending on the chosen attributes of a 
transaction (like shipping method), the quality of the product decreases faster or slower. 
(Stock perishes) 
The cooperation builds on past experiences with the current game and the conceptual 
game presented here. The project will be ready for use in April 2004. 
Discussion and implications for the real world 
The netchain laboratory provides a new place to experiment with netchains. Diederen and 
Jonkers (2001) consider four sets of exogenous variables relevant for Chain and Network 
Studies: enabling technologies, consumer market dynamics, spatial constraints and the 
institutional and socio-economic environment. The netchain laboratory limits itself to the 
last set of variables and specializes in governance issues between agents in a netchain. 
The ability to experiment with alternative configurations of a netchain, different incentive 
schemes and groups of different cultures proved to yield relevant results yet with the 
Trust and Tracing game. Future games and developments promise new insights in this 
complex field. 
Decision makers in netchain can profit from testing a new design in a laboratory. The use 
of real traders or managers in a simulated model provides a method to get feedback on a 
future situation before a costly implementation takes place. Major consultancy firms use 
simulation gaming for this purpose. Ivo Wenzler (2003) lists the results of 12 cases using 
this method and finds very good results. The availability of the lab to the field of chains 
and networks is a new addition.  
The impact of the laboratory may go beyond a place for experimenting. The conceptual 
model integrates many theories and makes aspect systems comparable in one major 
scheme. The possibility to discuss the consequences of changes in one aspect system on 
the other parts should lead to a better general understanding of issues in chains and 
networks. This alone can contribute to better decision-making. Omta et al (2001) notice 
the many isolated parts in science, management and policy making in chains and 
networks. The laboratory could help to integrate them. 
Hutte and Van der Woerd mentioned in their book “Het bedrijfsspel als leersituatie” (The 
management game as learning environment, SM) in 1965: “It is the hope of the authors 
that the integration of economy, management education and social psychology will be 
served by this publication.” Almost 40 years after these words, the netchain laboratory 
finds itself facing the same task. 
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